• REPEATED NON NEGATIVE BENEFITS OF THE COMMONS
Abstract
In this paper, we model a commons-game in which n-players (Number of resource users), with unobservable actions, available known-resource, with linear stock-cost function of its utilization generate non-negative payoff for repeated game. We impose regular three period punishments if the player cheat in the game at any period which is the non-negative benefit of the commons, not regulate the players to deviate from the current phase of the game. We find cooperation in the commons under the set of parameter value for the discount rate (δ) , resource growth rate g (.), harvesting rate of the resource users in each period.
Keywords
Commons, Repeated game theory.
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